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Abstract—Patterns of human encounters, which are difﬁcult to 
observe directly, are fundamental to the propagation of mobile 
malware aimed at infecting devices in spatial proximity. We 
investigate errors introduced by using scanners that detect the 
presence of devices on the assumption that device copresence 
at a scanner corresponds to a device encounter. We show in 
an ideal static model that only 59% of inferred encounters 
correspond to actual device copresence. To investigate the effects 
of mobility, we use a simulator to compare encounters between 
devices with those inferred by scanners. We show that the 
statistical properties of scanned encounters differ from actual 
device encounters in ways which impact malware propagation 
dynamics, a form of aggressive data dissemination. In addition to 
helping us understand the limitations of encounter data gathered 
by scanners in the ﬁeld, our use of virtual scanners suggests 
a practical method for using these empirical datasets to better 
inform simulations of proximity malware outbreaks and similar 
data dissemination applications. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the dynamics of propagation and assessing 
the effectiveness of countermeasures in outbreaks of self-
replicating computer malware relies on understanding two 
factors: the mechanism by which the malware infects a sus­
ceptible host, and the patterns of contact between hosts. For 
network-borne malware these contacts are practically instan­
taneous and enabled by network topology rather than spatial 
relationships. For malware targeting cellphones, propagation 
may take place over the infrastructure network, but also 
through direct “proximity connections”. Recently, malware 
has propagated over short-range radio connections, such as 
Bluetooth [1], [2]; at the same time, organizers of large events 
increasingly encourage Bluetooth activation for advertisements 
and crime prevention [3], increasing the risk of such malware 
threats. In the case of such proximity connections, the patterns 
of contact between people carrying the devices are critical in 
developing an understanding of the propagation dynamics. 
When attempting to understand and model proximity-based 
propagation the availability of relevant and generalizable em­
pirical data is limited. Here, we consider the approach of 
deploying scanners which use the same radio technology as 
devices carried by users. These scanners connect to users’ 
devices when they pass within range and store information 
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about the detected devices. Devices which are detected simul­
taneously by a given scanner are considered to be spatially 
co-located (corresponding to observed “encounters” within the 
scanner’s radio range). The main beneﬁt of such an approach 
is that once the scanners are deployed, large amounts of data 
can be gathered easily and at low cost, allowing longitudinal 
comparisons of encounter patterns. However, there are also 
some drawbacks when such scanner data is used as a basis 
for inferring proximity-based malware propagation dynamics: 
(i) Scanner deployments in the real world tend to be of 
relatively low density, typically covering a small fraction of 
an area under consideration, such as a campus or a part of a 
city. Hence, within this already limited area, the majority of 
encounters between devices will take place out of range of the 
scanners. (ii) Moreover, as we limit the area of consideration, 
we would expect the frequency with which particular devices 
appear at any scanner to decrease, artiﬁcially lengthening 
device inter-contact times. 
Despite these obvious limitations, if scanned data is used 
carefully (i.e., accounting for the effects of missed encounters) 
it would still appear to be a good source of empirically-derived 
data on human encounters. Superﬁcially, the encounters which 
are captured should consist of a subset of the actual device 
encounters taking place in the area under study at a particular 
time. In fact, we ﬁnd that the process of inferring copres­
ence encounters between pairs of devices based on empirical 
evidence of simultaneous sightings by third-party scanners 
leads to the introduction of errors. Here, we investigate the 
extent to which errors are introduced, and make the following 
contributions. 
•	 We derive analytical results on errors introduced in 
scanner-based measurements for a simpliﬁed case where 
all scanners and devices are static, and where radio prop­
agation details are omitted. We examine the differences 
between device copresence as inferred by the scanners 
and actual copresence between the devices, and classify 
the discrepancies. 
•	 Based on this classiﬁcation, we then derive the proba­
bilities with which each type of discrepancy will occur. 
Using simulation we validate our analytical ﬁnding that 
approximately 41% of copresence encounters inferred by 
scanners do not correspond to actual device copresence. 
•	 Also using simulation, we demonstrate the extent and 
impact of errors when device mobility is included. As a 
concrete application, we study the effect on proximity-
based malware propagation, an example of ﬂooding-
based data dissemination which depends heavily on the 
patterns of device encounters. We ﬁnd that, in addition 
to the expected cases of missed and spuriously inferred 
encounters, the set of encounters inferred from scanners 
differs from the actual encounters simulated in the model 
in terms of duration distribution and probability of en­
countering previously unmet devices. While the magni­
tude of these errors increases when simulated mobility is 
more diffusive, in all the cases we considered malware 
propagation models showed slower propagation using 
scanned encounters compared to actual encounters for 
devices with the same mobility characteristics. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several studies have considered propagation dynamics of, 
and defence strategies against, malware using proximity-based 
propagation [1], [4]–[7]. However, access to empirical data 
on which to base such studies is currently limited. What is 
required is either direct data on malware propagation, which 
is not generally available, or information about device encoun­
ters, with which one can model propagation of malware. 
In the absence of direct encounter data, human mobility data 
can also be used to infer encounters by considering spatial 
proximity between individuals. While human mobility data 
can be captured at a ﬁne resolution under certain conditions, 
e.g., by using GPS traces, requiring users to record their 
movements is typically considered intrusive and onerous. As a 
result, studies which attempt to gather such data have typically 
involved dozens or, at most, hundreds of users in a limited 
geographical area [8], [9]. 
At the other end of the spectrum in terms of number of 
users and data granularity, recent work has utilized information 
from mobile network operators, where cell phone connectivity 
to the nearest base station can be tracked [10]–[12]. This 
provides coarse mobility data for large numbers of users in a 
potentially large geographic area, but does not make it possible 
to determine when individual devices encounter each other 
and, for instance, are able to connect via Bluetooth. 
Another option, when interested in Bluetooth connectivity, 
is to directly collect data by deploying an application on 
participants’ Bluetooth devices which periodically scans for 
discoverable Bluetooth devices in range. However, as in the 
case of gathering GPS data, this approach is challenging in 
terms of both user effort and privacy. The Reality Mining 
project collected Bluetooth traces from approximately 100 
users over a period of nine months [13], using an application 
installed on cellphones; however, the devices scanned only 
once every ﬁve minutes, which is likely to have led to shorter 
copresence encounters going undetected. In [14], portable 
Bluetooth scanners were carried by up to twelve users for 
a period of ﬁve days, with scans being conducted every two 
minutes. 
Some of the earliest papers on Bluetooth malware included 
empirical tests where Bluetooth devices were carried around to 
collect data on other discoverable Bluetooth devices encoun­
tered [1], [15]. In both of these studies, however, the volume 
of data gathered directly from devices was not sufﬁcient to be 
used as a veridical source of encounter data for modelling a 
malware outbreak. Instead, [1] used encounter data from [13], 
while [15] used characteristics derived from their empirical 
data to parameterise a mobility trace generator based on social 
network theory [16]. 
Given the difﬁculty in gathering sufﬁcient data directly 
from devices, some work has been done using ﬁxed Bluetooth 
scanners to collect data on other Bluetooth devices passing by, 
including inference of what we call “copresence encounters” 
from the simultaneous presence of devices within the scanner’s 
range [2], [17], [18]. 
The Bluetooth scanning approach enables the collection of 
data for large numbers of devices over long periods of time, 
but has some problems in studying proximity-based malware 
propagation. These issues have not been systematically exam­
ined in the literature. 
III. FROM DEVICE CONTACTS TO INFERRED ENCOUNTERS 
The data captured by scanners is not necessarily an accurate 
representation of the real contacts taking place between mobile 
devices—even if we consider only the subset of real contacts 
taking place within the scanner’s range. Scanners infer copres­
ence encounters when a device pair is simultaneously sighted 
at the same scanner. We assume throughout that the scanner 
has the same radio range as the devices. Simple geometry 
indicates that a scanner, if capable of the same radio range 
as the devices moving around it, will be able to make contact 
with pairs of devices which are simultaneously within range 
of the scanner, but not within range of each other. This effect, 
which we term “bridging”, leads to the incorrect inference of 
encounters between devices which did not actually meet (see 
Figure 2). 
A. Static Analysis 
To begin to understand the relationship between scanned 
encounters and actual contacts between mobile devices, we 
ﬁrst consider a simpliﬁed case: a single time instance in 
which all devices and scanners are static. We derive simple 
expressions for the expected number of different encounter 
types as seen by an array of ﬁxed scanners. 
We consider n devices, each equipped with a short-range 
radio. We assume that this radio behaves ideally, producing a 
disc of constant signal strength with radius r. The devices are 
uniformly distributed over a rectangular area of size a×b, and 
are observed by m scanners using the same radio technology 
and placed in the same area. We assume that the coverage 
areas of scanners do not overlap. 
Let Xi (i = 1, . . . , n) denote the position of each device. 
We assume that these 2-dimensional random vectors Xi are 
independent and identically uniformly distributed (iid) over 
the rectangle [0, a] × [0, b]. Using a simpliﬁed “perfect disc” 
� � 
� � 
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radio propagation assumption, we say that two devices i and j 
are in contact if they are within radio range, that is �Xi −
Xj � ≤ r. With a slight abuse of notation, we write r(Xi,Xj ) 
as a shorthand for this relation, and r(Xi,Xj ) as a shorthand 
for its negation (i.e., �Xi −Xj � > r). 
Similarly let yk (k = 1, . . . ,m) denote the scanner posi­
tions. Then, using our shorthand notation, the event that device 
i is in range of the kth scanner can be expressed as r(Xi,yk). 
In our model, a scanner k registers an inferred contact be­
tween two devices, i and j, if both devices are simultaneously 
within the scanner’s range; or, more formally: 
r(Xi,yk) ∧ r(Xj ,yk). 
Note that an inferred contact need not correspond to an actual 
device contact, since two devices may both be in range of 
the same scanner without being in range of one another (the 
“bridging effect”). On the other hand, not all actual device 
contacts will be inferred by a scanner, since either one or 
both of the devices involved in a contact with each other may 
be outside scanner range. The following analysis classiﬁes all 
possible relationships between device contacts and the contacts 
inferred by scanners. 
1) Types of Contacts Considered: Not all device contacts 
can be inferred by scanners, and not all contacts which the 
scanners do observe correspond to actual contacts between 
devices. We set out to derive expressions for the expected 
number of: 
• real contacts between devices, 
• contacts inferred by scanners (consisting of): 
– correctly inferred contacts (“inferred real”), 
– incorrectly inferred contacts (“inferred fake”), 
•	 real device contacts missed by scanners, because

– one device is outside coverage (“missed one”),

– both devices are outside coverage (“missed two”). 
Figure 1 shows a diagram relating these contact types. We 
assume a sufﬁciently sparse scanner arrangement to preclude 
missed contacts where both devices are in scanner range, but 
the two devices are in the range of two different scanners. 
missed 
missed 
one 
real 
inferred 
fake 
inferredtwo 
Fig. 1. Contact types: real (thick ellipse) and inferred (thin ellipse) contacts 
2) Real Contacts: Intuitively, the expected number of de­
vice contacts (without regard to which of these are inferred 
or missed by the scanners) for n iid devices should equal the 
number of possible device pairs, n 
2 
, times the probability of 
contact between any two devices. In the following derivations 
P denotes probabilities. Let us denote the ratio of a coverage 
area to the total observation area by 
. r
2π 
p = .	 (1) 
ab 
Now, one can write the expected number of real contacts as 
n 
creal = p(1 − δ) (2) 
2 
where δ is an error term accounting for border effects. In the 
model, the border effects can be removed, e.g., by having edge 
wrap-around (effectively forming a torus), in which case the 
error term can be omitted. 
3) Observed Contacts: For a single scanner at position y ∈
[r, a − r] × [r, b − r], we have 
P [r(Xi,y)] = p, ∀i. 
Thus, the expected number of inferred contacts for this scanner 
equals n 
2 
p2; i.e., the number of device pairs times the 
probability that both devices “independently” fall inside the 
scanner’s coverage area. For m scanners, whose coverage areas 
do not overlap and lie completely inside the measurement area, 
the above probability for a single scanner is simply multiplied 
by m to yield the expected number of inferred contacts. 
n 
cinferred = m p 
2 ≈ mp creal (3) 
2 
The result may appear intuitively satisfying, as it suggests 
that the scanners capture the fraction of real contacts cor­
responding to their combined coverage area. Unfortunately, 
this intuition is somewhat misleading, since a sizable portion 
of these inferred contacts are in fact “fake” and result from 
bridging, as we show next. 
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Fig. 2. Bridging probability. The position and coverage area of the scanner 
are shown by a + and the solid circle, while those of the ﬁrst device by 
an × and a dashed circle. If the position of the second device falls inside 
the dark-shaded area to the right, the scanner will infer a contact while none 
actually occurs. 
The bridging probability β is the conditional probability 
that two devices both inside the same scanner’s coverage area 
are not within range of one another. Pictorially speaking, this 
corresponds to the average fraction of the darker half-moon­
shaped area to the right in Figure 2. While we omit the full 
derivation for brevity, we have 
.	 3
√
3 
β = P [r(X1,X2) | r(X1,y1), r(X2,y1)] = 
4π 
(4) 
� � 
� � 
� � �	 � � � 
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In other words, over 41% of inferred contacts are fake, 
introduced by bridging; and, consequently, only about 59% 
of inferred contacts correspond to real device contacts. The 
resulting formulas for the expected number of real and fake 
inferred contacts can be written as follows. 
cinferred,real = m 
n 
2 
p 2(1 − β) ≈ 0.5865 cinferred (5) � � 
cinferred,fake = m 
n 
2 
p 2β ≈ 0.4135 cinferred (6) 
4) Missed Contacts: As noted earlier, due to our assump­
tions on scanner placement, we consider only two types of 
missed contacts. In the ﬁrst, one of the devices is inside 
scanner range while the other one is outside; and in the second 
type, both devices are outside scanner range. 
Another careful look at Figure 2 reveals that the conditional 
probability of a device outside a given scanner’s range being in 
range of another device inside the same scanner’s range also 
equals the bridging probability β (as this case corresponds 
to the unshaded half-moon-shaped area on the right in the 
ﬁgure). Given that, viewed as an ordered pair, either of the 
two devices in this type of missed contact could be inside or 
outside scanner range, the following formula obtains: 
n 
cmissed,one = 2m p 
2β = 2 cinferred,fake ≈ 0.827 cinferred (7) 
2 
where one factor of p corresponds to r(X1,y1) (i.e., the 
probability that the “ﬁrst” device is in scanner range) and the 
other to r(X1,X2) (i.e., that the two devices are within range 
of one another). 
When both devices are outside scanner range, the analysis 
naturally splits into two sub-cases: one that accounts for border 
effects around the edges of the observation area, and another 
that accounts for similar effects near each scanner, when 
the scanner’s and the devices’ coverage areas intersect, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Border effect near a scanner. If the ﬁrst device is within distance 2r 
of a scanner (dotted circle), the position of the second device must fall inside 
the dark-shaded area to the left in order to guarantee that both devices end 
up outside scanner range. 
The geometry of the dark shaded area in Figure 3 is 
essentially the same as the geometry of the dark shaded 
area in Figure 2, with the notable exception that the distance 
between the scanner’s and the device’s position varies between 
r and 2r (compared to 0 and r for the bridging probability). 
Consequently, λk, the corresponding conditional probability 
for scanner yk, can be obtained in the same fashion, giving: 
. 
λk = P [r(X2,yk) r(X1,X2), 2r(X1,yk), r(X1,yk)] √
3 
|
β 
= 1 − = 1 −	 (8) 
4π 3 
Using equation (8) and subject to the constraints that: 
a) the distance between any two scanners is at least 4r, 
which avoids simultaneous interactions with multiple 
scanners, and 
b) the distance between any scanner and the edge of the 
observation area is at least 3r, excluding interactions 
between scanners and edge effects, 
the expected number of missed contacts due to both devices 
being outside scanner coverage can be derived as follows. 
n 
cmissed,two = P r(X1,X2), r(X2,yl), r(X1,yl)
2 
l l  
n	 � 
= P r(X1,X2) � 2r(X1,yl) (1 − δ − 4mp)
2	 � 
l  
+	 λkp(4p− p) 
k 
n	 β 
= p(1 − δ − 4mp) + m(4p− p)p(1 − )
2	 3 
n 
= p (1 − δ −mp(1 + β))	 (9) 
2 
=creal − (cinferred,real + cmissed,one) (10) 
B. Validation 
To validate our analysis, we performed a simple simulation. 
Using the same constraints as above on scanner arrangement, 
we randomly placed 5,000 devices and 144 scanners, both with 
a range r = 10m, within a simulated area of size 500m ×
500m. We then compared the encounters recorded directly by 
the devices with the encounters inferred by the scanners over 
100 simulation runs. 
In our simulation an average of 41.347% (SD=1.29%) of 
encounters inferred by the scanners were “fake”, that is, they 
did not correspond to pairs of devices which were in range of 
each other. We further found that the mean number of pairwise 
encounters missed by scanners because only one device was in 
range, divided by the total number of encounters which were 
inferred by scanners, was 0.829 (SD=0.044). These values 
compare to the expectations of 41.35% (Eq. 6) and 0.827 
(Eq. 7) which were derived in our previous analysis. 
IV.	 SCANNER ERRORS IN MOBILE DATA 
In Figure 1 we deﬁned the four possible classiﬁcations of 
contact types in a static scenario: inferred-real, inferred-fake, 
missed-one, missed-two. These contact types describe all the 
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Inferred real 
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Missed one | two 
Exact Match Missed Encounter Spurious Match Partial Match Missed Encounter Partial Match 
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Fig. 4. Relating device contacts to scanned encounters 
ways in which a scanner might (or might not) register an 
encounter between two devices at a particular moment in time. 
When mobility and time are introduced, the way in which 
a scanner infers (or misses) an encounter can be thought of 
as a sequence of successive static contacts over a period of 
time. The relationship between the device encounter and what 
is inferred (or not) by the scanner falls into four possible 
classiﬁcations, each characterised by which of the four contact 
types makes up the sequence. We show the relationship 
between device encounters and scanned encounters, and their 
corresponding contact types, in Figure 4. The top time-series 
shows the ground truth of the encounters of two devices, and 
the bottom time-series shows the different ways a scanner 
may infer (or miss) device encounters. The shading on each 
scanned encounter relates to the contact types from which 
it is composed over time. While we separately considered 
the distinct probabilities of missed-one and missed-two in our 
static analysis, the distinction is not useful from here on; in 
both cases a device encounter goes undetected by all scanners. 
•	 Exact matches. Encounters between two devices that 
take place entirely within scanner range. Devices are only 
within range of a scanner for the period of time that 
they are within range of each other. These encounters 
are composed entirely of inferred-real contacts, as in the 
encounter in Figure 4 beginning at time tn+1. 
•	 Missed encounters. Encounters between two devices that 
take place beyond the range of scanners are composed of 
missed-one or missed-two contacts. In Figure 4 this is 
shown by an unbordered solid area at time tn+4. 
•	 Spurious matches. Encounters between two devices 
when the devices are each within range of a scanner, 
yet are never actually in range of each other. These 
encounters are composed entirely of successive inferred-
fake contacts, as in the encounter in Figure 4 at time 
tn+8. 
•	 Partial matches. Encounters between pairs of devices 
which are composed of more than one of the four types of 
contact (other than a mixture of missed-one and missed-
two). Compared to the actual encounter the scanner may 
infer one or more longer or shorter encounters which 
partially overlap in time with the actual encounter. In 
Figure 4 two such encounters are shown beginning at 
times tn+10 and tn+16. 
The extent to which the encounters inferred (or missed) 
by scanners fall into each of these categories is critical when 
considering the degree of error which is likely to appear in 
malware propagation models based on them. 
Consider an ideal scanner, which was somehow able to 
accurately infer all device encounters which passed within its 
range. For this scanner, all of its inferred encounters would 
fall into one of the ﬁrst two categories above. As such, they 
would be composed entirely of inferred real and missed one 
or missed two contacts. By deﬁnition, the encounters inferred 
by this scanner would be a subset of the total set of device 
encounters which took place in the area under study. While 
those encounters which never passed in range of the scanner 
would be missed, if we assume that devices are dispersed 
uniformly around the area then we would expect the selection 
of encounters which the scanner did infer to be unbiased. 
As such, a deployment of a number of these ideal scanners 
would together collect a subset of total device encounters (once 
de-duplicated to account for encounters which pass through 
multiple scanners). We would expect the relative numbers of 
encounters inferred to reﬂect the ratio of scanner coverage area 
to the total area under study. If we compared the property 
distributions (e.g., encounter duration) of the scanner and 
device encounters, we would expect to see no difference. As a 
consequence, once we adjusted for the lower encounter rates 
in the scanner data, we would expect to see identical dynamics 
of propagation between the two sources of encounter data. 
In practice, we can easily identify ways in which scanners 
deviate from ideal behaviour. In our previous analysis, we 
have shown that bridging leads scanners to incorrectly infer 
copresence in around 41% of device pair sightings. These 
incorrect inferences will give rise to partial matches and 
spurious matches appearing in the scanner data, which differ 
from, or do not actually appear in, the device encounters. In 
addition, when we consider moving devices over time, even 
in the absence of bridging, scanners can report encounters 
which differ from actual device encounters. For example, a 
pair of devices may remain in range of each other while 
moving on equal vectors. They may pass in and out of the 
ranges of a number of scanners, which will report numerous 
shorter encounters between the pair, instead of one continuous 
meeting. In this particular example, the scanner data will 
contain a number of partial match encounters. If we again 
consider the distribution of encounter duration in the scanner 
encounters, a disparity will clearly be introduced compared to 
the device encounters. 
Having shown the circumstances in which the use of scan­
ners to infer copresence can introduce errors, the remainder 
of the paper investigates how often these errors occur, and the 
extent to which they lead to inaccurate estimates of proximity 
borne malware propagation as one concrete application. 
A. Methodology 
Compared to our analytical solution for the static case, a 
similar analytic model for the dynamic case of devices that 
are mobile over time is substantially more complex. On the 
other hand, obtaining empirical data with which to compare 
the incidence of errors in scanned encounters is also difﬁcult. 
To understand the extent of errors introduced by the use of 
scanners in the case of mobile devices, we require data on 
both the real encounters (as detected by devices themselves) 
and the encounters inferred from scanners for the same set of 
devices at the same time. Most datasets consist of either high 
volume scanned data or relatively low volume GPS trace data, 
but not both. 
Lacking empirical data, we instead use a mobility simulator 
to produce complete traces of mobile devices moving within a 
simulated two-dimensional space. To obtain a baseline for the 
actual encounters between devices, we process the mobility 
traces generated by the simulator to identify the encounters 
between pairs of devices over time. Using the same deﬁnition 
as in the static case above, we say that a pair of devices i and 
j with positions given by two-dimensional vectors Xi and Xj 
are within radio range while �Xi −Xj � ≤ r. As the devices 
move over time, we say that they are in a pairwise encounter 
for any contiguous time period during which they remain in 
radio range, i.e., for an encounter between times tm and tn 
(where m < n): 
�Xi(ts) −Xj (ts)� ≤ r ∀s : m ≤ s ≤ n 
We then simulated the deployment of “virtual scanners” in the 
simulated area to generate encounters inferred from scanner 
observations. From the perspective of a scanner, two devices 
have an encounter when both devices are simultaneously 
within range of the scanner for a speciﬁed time period. 
With these two data sets, we can then compare the baseline 
“actual” encounters with the inferred “scanner” encounters 
to understand the nature and frequency of encounter errors 
introduced by the use of scanners. The use of simulation also 
allows us to investigate the effects of scanner density on the 
accuracy and completeness of scanned data by deploying up 
to thousands of scanners per square kilometer. 
1) Mobility simulator: We employ a mobility simulator 
which implements the Le´vy walk mobility model described 
in [9]. We note that a considerable variety of synthetic 
mobility models have been proposed over time, including 
models proposed after the Le´vy walk model (e.g., SLAW [19], 
SWIM [20], and individual-mobility [21]). We sidestep de­
bates about the “best” mobility model, and instead observe 
that the Le´vy model has the merits of validation with large 
realistic traces [9] and is relatively popular and increasingly 
well understood (e.g., [22]). Other models might result in 
different absolute values for malware propagation times and 
encounter distributions, but, given the inherent approach of 
using scanners to infer device encounters, we believe that the 
effects we observe are illustrative of the problem and not the 
mobility model. 
We consider a number of agents, each carrying a device with 
a radio range of 10m (a typical range for proximity commu­
nication using Bluetooth), and we consider a pair of devices 
to be copresent if both are within the other’s radio range. 
As before, we make the simplifying assumption that radios 
produce a sharply-demarcated disc of constant signal strength. 
The agents move in steps, with each step being comprised of a 
ﬂight — motion in a single direction θ (randomly chosen from 
a uniform distribution such that 0◦ 360◦) — followed ≤ θ ≤
by a pause, during which the agent is stationary. For each step, 
the ﬂight length and pause time are chosen randomly from two 
Le´vy distributions respectively having scale factors α (ﬂight 
length) and β (pause time). Additionally, for ﬂight length and 
pause time values, we apply unit scale factors c and d, and 
maximum values tf and tp. 
As in [9] ﬂight time (and hence velocity) is related to ﬂight 
length to reﬂect the greater probability that longer ﬂights use 
a mode of transportation other than walking. Flight length is 
given by tf = kl1−p, where k and p are constants and 0 ≤ p ≤
1. For ﬂights of less than 500m, we use values of k = 18.72 
and p = 0.79. For longer ﬂights over 500m, we use values of 
k = 1.37, p = 0.46. We set unit scale factors for ﬂight length 
c of 10m, and pause time d of 1 second in all simulations. 
To reduce the effects of reﬂection on device mobility 
patterns, we deﬁne a large square area within which devices 
move (3000m 3000m). If devices reach the edge of this ×
area, their ﬂights reﬂect off the outer boundary and continue 
their current ﬂight step. We also deﬁne a smaller central inner 
area (1000m × 1000m) as the area of device interaction, and 
consider encounters between devices only within this area. 
Inside the central inner area we deploy “virtual scanners” 
at ﬁxed locations. These static scanners, like the mobile 
devices, have a 10m radio range and are placed at least 20m 
apart to avoid overlapping coverage areas. For simplicity of 
implementation, the scanners were placed on a square lattice, 
resulting in scanner coverage of 79% of the total area. 
To investigate whether differing mobility parameters af­
fected the extent and nature of errors in the scanned data, we 
use three sets of parameters for the scale factors of ﬂight length 
(α) and pause time (β) distributions in the Le´vy walk model. 
Each of these three pairs of α and β values represent simula­
tion parameters found to ﬁt well with empirical GPS datasets 
gathered from sets of walkers in three separate locations [9]: 
San Francisco (α = 0.75, β = 1.68), NCSU (α = 0.86, 
β = 0.99) and KAIST (α = 0.97, β = 0.45). For each of the 
three mobility parameter sets we performed 25 simulation runs 
lasting one week of simulated time, each for 900 devices. We 
assume all devices are susceptible, corresponding to malware 
propagation among mobile users who share devices with the 
same platform (and are a subset of all mobile users [2]). In 
each case, we deployed 2,500 scanners within the inner area 
(1000m × 1000m) of the simulation. 
B. Simulation results 
Our simulations produced datasets containing, for each 
mobility trace, a set of device encounters sensed by the 
mobile devices themselves, and a set of scanned encounters 
inferred by the “virtual scanners”. In comparing the two sets 
of encounters, our aim was to highlight the errors introduced 
by incorrect inferences leading to partial match and spurious 
match scanner encounters and their impact on simulations of 
malware propagation models using the encounter data. 
1) Comparing malware propagation dynamics: As an ini­
tial test of our assertion that the use of scanned encounter data 
may lead to inaccurate estimates of malware propagation, we 
performed a simple malware propagation simulation using the 
encounter data from our simulator. At a high level, proximity­
based malware propagation is a form of data dissemination in 
opportunistic ad-hoc networks. As such, since such malware 
propagation strongly depends upon the distributions of device 
contacts and contact durations, it is particularly useful for eval­
uating the sensitivity of such data dissemination applications 
to errors in device encounter data. As discussed above, our 
aim is to investigate the errors which arise in encounter data 
as a result of the scanners’ deviation from ideal behaviour. A 
deployment of ideal scanners would infer a subset of device 
encounters, selected without bias, whose size is related to the 
proportion of area under scanner coverage. 
Since scanner coverage in our simulation was incomplete, 
we would not expect propagation between the scanned and 
device encounters to match, even in the unlikely event that 
our virtual scanners behaved ideally. To control for the effects 
of incomplete scanner coverage, we created a normalised set 
of device encounters for use in our propagation model. This 
dataset consists of a subset sampled at random from the set of 
device encounters such that, for each mobility trace, the subset 
contains the same number of encounters as the corresponding 
set of scanned encounters. While we make no attempt to match 
the particular encounters taking place at scanner sites in this 
subset, we would expect the aggregate characteristics of the 
encounters to match those which our scanners would have 
inferred had they behaved ideally. 
Figure 5 shows mean propagation over time over 100 
runs on each mobility trace. Each simulation run assumed 
one initially infected device in a standard susceptible-infected 
(SI) model, with all devices susceptible and a latency for 
propagation of 30 seconds. For all three of the mobility 
parameter sets we see, as expected, that propagation proceeds 
more slowly in the “normalised” subset of device encounters. 
It is also apparent that when the scanned encounter sets 
are used in the model, despite having the same number of 
encounters as the normalised subsets of device encounters, 
propagation is slower still in all three mobility traces. The 
difference between propagation using the normalised device
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Fig. 5. Malware propagation, comparing device encounters, normalised 
device encounters and scanned encounters. 
encounters and the scanner encounters is large. After two days 
of simulation time, the respective mean proportions of infected 
devices are: SF 40.2% vs. 26.4%, NCSU 61.6% vs. 46.4%, and 
KAIST 67.9% vs. 60.8%. 
This experiment shows that the use of scanned encounters, 
when compared to subsets of device encounters, leads to an 
underestimation of propagation rates in proximity malware 
models. The deviation suggests that our scanners are not 
behaving ideally, and are introducing wrongly inferred partial 
match and spurious match encounters. The extent of these 
errors of inference is sufﬁcient to alter the characteristics of 
the whole set of device encounters. 
2) Encounter overlaps: Our malware propagation simula­
tion shows that the sets of scanned encounters differ from 
those detected directly by the mobile devices, and that this 
difference is attributable to incorrect inferences by the scanners 
which lead to the reporting of erroneous encounters. To 
better understand the nature of these erroneous encounters, 
we directly compared the scanner and encounter data from 
each individual mobility trace. By considering the encounters 
between each device pair which met (or was inferred to 
have met) at least once during the simulation, we show the 
proportion of encounter types present in the scanned encounter 
data (including missed encounters). 
For each encounter between devices, we determined 
whether, in the set of scanned encounters, an encounter 
between the same two devices existed with the same start 
and end time (an exact match), or whether one or more 
partial matches existed which overlapped it in time. Device 
encounters where no match or overlap was found correspond 
to missed encounters (combining missed-one and missed-two 
static contacts). Repeating the process from the perspective of 
the scanned encounters revealed the spurious matches which 
did not overlap any device encounters. 
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Fig. 6. Relationships between device and scanner encounters by encounter 
type. 
We ﬁrst compared all encounters in the device and scanned 
encounter sets for each mobility parameter set (i.e., a minimum 
encounter duration of zero). We see that approximately two-
thirds of device encounters have a corresponding exact match 
or partial match in the scanned encounters. There is little 
difference in this proportion between the three mobility sets. 
The incidence of exact matches is low, representing 6.5%, 
5.5% and 4.4% of total device encounters in the San Francisco, 
NCSU and KAIST mobility parameters, meaning that almost 
all of the encounters actually inferred by the scanners are either 
partial matches or spurious matches. 
Given the sensitivity of proximity-based malware propaga­
tion to encounter duration (since infection latency may be 30 
seconds or more), we repeated the experiment using subsets 
of the device and scanner encounters with successively higher 
minimum durations. For all of the mobility traces, we ﬁrst see 
that, once a minimum threshold of 15 seconds is imposed, 
the proportion of exact matches becomes vanishingly small. 
Where exact matches do occur, they are typically between 
encounters of short duration. This result is not unexpected, 
and suggests that very short encounters may simply offer less 
opportunity for erroneous inferences to take place. 
We also see that the proportion of missed encounters 
and spurious encounters rises for all three mobility traces 
as the minimum encounter duration threshold increases. A 
calculation of correlation between the proportion of missed 
encounters to total device encounters and minimum latency 
threshold suggests that a strong relationship exists in all cases 
(SF r2 = 0.96, NCSU r2 = 0.96, KAIST r2 = 0.92). A 
TABLE I 
ENCOUNTERS EXCEEDING EXAMPLE MALWARE PROPAGATION LATENCIES 
(IN SECONDS) 
P (D) n(D)Device encs. (m) Scanned encs. (m) 
P (S) n(S) 
SF 
All 3.20 (100.0%) 2.84 (100.0%) 0.0% -11.1% 
>15 0.38 (11.9%) 0.28 (10.0%) -15.9% -25.2% 
>30 0.14 (4.3%) 0.09 (3.2%) -25.6% -33.8% 
>45 0.57 (1.8%) 0.03 (1.2%) -34.7% -41.9% 
>60 0.02 (0.7%) 0.01 (0.4%) -42.6% -49.0% 
NCSU 
All 2.53 (100.0%) 2.24 (100.0%) 0.0% -11.4% 
>15 0.42 (16.5%) 0.32 (14.2%) -13.8% -23.6% 
>30 0.17 (6.8%) 0.12 (5.3%) -22.1% -31.0% 
>45 0.80 (3.2%) 0.05 (2.3%) -28.4% -36.6% 
>60 0.04 (1.5%) 0.02 (1.0%) -33.2% -40.9% 
KAIST 
All 1.40 (100.0%) 1.19 (100.0%) 0.0% -15.3% 
>15 0.37 (26.1%) 0.29 (24.0%) -8.0% -22.0% 
>30 0.19 (13.9%) 0.15 (12.4%) -10.6% -24.3% 
>45 0.12 (8.6%) 0.09 (7.6%) -11.8% -25.3% 
>60 0.08 (5.7%) 0.06 (5.0%) -12.4% -25.8% 
similar calculation of correlation between the proportion of 
spurious encounters and minimum encounter duration showed 
a less strong relationship which appeared to strengthen in the 
less diffusive mobility parameter sets (SF r2 = 0.71, NCSU 
r2 = 0.82, KAIST r2 = 0.89). 
The relationship between encounter length and proportion of 
missed encounters appears counter-intuitive. While practically 
all encounters over 15 seconds for all mobility traces do not 
match exactly between the scanner and device encounters, 
we had expected that longer encounters would experience 
a higher level of partial overlaps, if only by chance. Our 
experiments showing the opposite to be true suggest that there 
are differences between the distribution of encounter durations 
in the scanner and encounter datasets, with the scanner datasets 
simply including fewer long encounters to match against the 
device encounters. 
3) Encounter duration: The correlation between increasing 
encounter duration and incidence of missed and spuriously 
matched encounters in the scanner data led us to investigate 
the distribution of encounter duration between the device and 
scanner encounter sets. The duration of encounters is important 
when modelling the propagation of proximity-borne malware, 
where propagation between devices might occur only during 
uninterrupted connections of 30 seconds or more. 
For each of the three mobility parameter sets, all simulation 
runs were combined to produce large sets of device encounters 
and scanner encounters. We calculated the proportion of 
encounters within each encounter set which were longer than a 
set of latency thresholds for proximity malware transmission. 
As Table I shows, in all cases a smaller proportion of the 
scanned encounters exceeds the latency thresholds. In other 
words, the scanned encounters underestimate the duration of 
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Fig. 7. “Uniqueness” of device vs. scanner encounters 
the device encounters considerably. For longer but still realistic 
latency values of one minute, the proportion of scanned 
encounters lasting long enough to allow malware propagation 
to occur is lower than the device encounters by between 12% 
and 42% across the three sets of mobility parameters. 
4) Encounter “uniqueness”: We have shown that the 
scanned encounters generated by our simulator differ from 
the device encounters by having characteristics which lead to 
underestimation of malware propagation when these scanned 
encounters are used as source data. To further investigate the 
extent to which the scanned encounters differ from the device 
encounters, we compared the distribution of contact degrees 
of each set of encounter data. The distribution of contact 
degrees is a key driver of malware propagation: the dynamics 
of epidemic spread in networks with heavy-tailed distributions 
of encounter degrees differ signiﬁcantly from “fully-mixed” 
models in which all agents are equally likely to meet [23]. 
However, contact degree is related to encounter rates, and 
the incomplete coverage of the area provided by scanners 
will likely result in lower encounter rates. As a result the 
contact degrees of device and scanned encounters cannot be 
directly compared. To address this, we calculated a normalised 
metric, encounter uniqueness, which is the proportion of 
unique devices within the total devices encountered in a given 
period. In the case where a device meets each other device only 
once, all its encounters can be described as unique, giving a 
value of 1.0. As the proportion of encounters with previously­
seen devices increases the ratio of unique encounters falls. For 
encounters with similar distributions of encounter duration, we 
would expect higher encounter uniqueness to correspond to 
increased rates of malware propagation. 
To ensure comparability across our simulation data, we 
calculated the uniqueness values for encounters from the 
simulation start until each device in the simulation had met a 
given number of unique devices. We repeated this process for 
each of the mobility traces across all three mobility parameter 
sets. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the uniqueness ratio 
for the device and scanned encounters. 
As expected, the more diffusive mobility parameter sets 
(NCSU, SF) show a higher encounter uniqueness. Longer 
ﬂight lengths mean that devices are less likely to repeatedly 
encounter devices they have previously met. However, the two 
more diffusive mobility parameter sets are also most affected 
by underestimation of encounter uniqueness in the scanned 
encounters, while the least diffusive mobility parameter set 
(KAIST) shows very little difference in encounter uniqueness 
between the device encounters and the scanned encounters. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Our detailed examination of errors induced by inferring 
device encounters from third party scanners suggests caution in 
the use of such data sets, for instance, for the study of ﬂooding­
based data dissemination applications like proximity malware 
propagation. However, it is also suggestive of a potential way 
forward. 
We have demonstrated the circumstances in which “bridg­
ing” errors between pairs of out-of-range devices occur. 
Further, we have shown, under assumptions of equal and 
homogeneous communication ranges, that over 41% of de­
vice encounters inferred from simultaneous scanner sightings 
were incorrect. In the case of mobile devices, these incor­
rect inferences have a complex effect on the accuracy of 
scanned encounters as they accumulate over time. As well 
as encounters which are missed or spuriously inferred by 
considering sightings at scanners, unreliable inference results 
in inferred encounters which have shorter durations than the 
actual encounters between devices, and underestimates the 
extent to which the devices encounter new, unmet devices. 
The magnitude of these differences is sensitive to the un­
derlying mobility characteristics of the devices being scanned, 
with more diffusive mobility correlating with increased errors. 
In all three sets of mobility parameters we tested (each 
closely matching GPS trails gathered from human movement), 
the extent of errors introduced through inferring copresence 
by simultaneous presence at scanners led to a signiﬁcant 
underestimation of the rate at which proximity-based malware 
would spread amongst devices. 
On the other hand, our use of a mobility simulator to 
compare actual encounters observed from mobility trails with 
encounters inferred from sightings at scanners suggests a 
method for mitigating erroneous inferences of copresence in 
data gathered by scanners deployed in the ﬁeld. In cases 
of highly diffusive mobility, where the errors introduced by 
bridging appear to be most pronounced, the quality of scanned 
encounter data might be materially improved, leading to more 
accurate simulations of malware spread and countermeasures. 
Estimated or observed characteristics of mobility patterns 
around the scanners, such as the distribution of velocities, 
ﬂight lengths and pause times would be used to set initial 
parameters for a mobility simulator. This simulator would then 
be populated with virtual scanners similar to those used in the 
ﬁeld, and used to infer simulated encounters. The mobility 
parameters used in the simulation could then be improved 
iteratively until the simulated encounters closely matched the 
statistical properties of those gathered from the ﬁeld scanners. 
The malware propagation model could then be based on 
the direct encounters between devices in the simulator. Since 
the same fundamental geometry leads to errors in simulated 
scanners and the real deployed scanners we would expect 
the incidence of bridging errors in both cases to be similar, 
provided the simulator’s mobility parameters closely match 
the observed characteristics of mobility around the deployed 
scanners. This being the case, the direct encounters between 
devices in the simulator should capture the observed properties 
of human mobility at the scanner sites, while reducing errors 
from incorrect inferences — and in doing so be closer to the 
real human encounters which took place around the scanners. 
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